

# The Brazilian Honey Pots Alliance

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CERT.br – Computer Emergency Response Team Brazil

NIC.br - Network Information Center Brazil

CGI.br - Brazilian Internet Steering Committee

## Questions Asked by the Organizers

- What motivated the project?
- What kind of data is collected?
- How is the data collected?
- What are the data sharing agreements or restrictions?
- How is the data used?

# Agenda

- CERT.br mission and its relation with project's motivations
- The Brazilian Honeypots Alliance
- Architecture
- Data collection
- Data usage
- Benefits and challenges

## Our Parent Organization: The Brazilian Internet Steering Committee - CGI.br


CGI.br is a multi-stakeholder organization that, among the diverse responsibilities, has the main attributions:

- to propose policies and procedures related to the regulation of Internet activities
- to recommend standards for technical and operational procedures
- to establish strategic directives related to the use and development of Internet in Brazil
- **to promote studies and technical standards for the network and services' security in the country**
- to coordinate the allocation of Internet addresses (IP) and the registration of domain names using <.br>
- **to collect, organize and disseminate information on Internet services, including indicators and statistics**

<http://www.cgi.br/internacional/>

FIRST TC - Doha, Qatar - April 15, 2007 (4/18)

# Brazilian Internet Steering Committee (CGI.br) Structure



- 1 – Ministry of Science and Technology (Coordination)
- 2 – Ministry of Communications
- 3 – Presidential Cabinet
- 4 – Ministry of Defense
- 5 – Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade
- 6 – Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management
- 7 – National Telecommunications Agency
- 8 – National Council of Scientific and Technological Development
- 9 – National Forum of Estate Science and Technology Secretaries
- 10 – Internet Expert

- 11 – Internet Service Providers
- 12 – Telecommunication Infrastructure Providers
- 13 – Hardware and Software Industries
- 14 – General Business Sector Users
- 15 – Non-governmental Entity
- 16 – Non-governmental Entity
- 17 – Non-governmental Entity
- 18 – Non-governmental Entity
- 19 – Academia
- 20 – Academia
- 21 – Academia

## CERT.br Mission

- Created in 1997 to *handle computer security incident reports and activities related to networks connected to the Internet in Brazil.*
  - National focal point for reporting security incidents
  - Establish collaborative relationships with other entities
  - Help new CSIRTs to establish their activities
  - Provide training in incident handling
  - Produce best practices' documents
  - Help raise the security awareness in the country

<http://www.cert.br/mission.html>

## Brazilian Honey Pots Alliance Distributed Honey Pots Project

**Main objective:** to increase the capacity of incident detection, event correlation and trend analysis in the Brazilian Internet


- Joint Coordination: CERT.br and CenPRA/MCT
- 37 partner institutions:
  - Academic, government, industry, telecom and military networks
- Widely distributed across the country
- Based on voluntary work
- Maintain public statistics

<http://www.honeypots-alliance.org.br/>

- HoneyNet Research Alliance Member since June 2002

<http://honeynet.org/alliance/>

# Cities Where the Honeypots are Located



# Partner Institutions (April/2007)

#	City	Institutions
01	São José dos Campos	INPE, ITA
02	Rio de Janeiro	CBPF, Embratel, Fiocruz, IME, PUC-Rio, RedeRio, UFRJ
03	São Paulo	ANSP, CERT.br, Diveo, Durand, UNESP, UOL, USP
04	Campinas	CenPRA, ITAL, UNICAMP, UNICAMP FEEC
05	São José do Rio Preto	UNESP
06	Piracicaba	USP
07	Brasília	Brasil Telecom, Ministry of Justice, TCU, UNB LabRedes
08	Natal	UFRN
09	Petrópolis	LNCC
10	Porto Alegre	CERT-RS
11	Ribeirão Preto	USP
12	São Carlos	USP
13	Taubaté	UNITAU
14	Florianópolis	UFSC DAS
15	Americana	VIVAX
16	Manaus	VIVAX
17	Joinville	UDESC
18	Lins	FPTE
19	Uberlândia	CTBC Telecom
20	Santo André	VIVAX
21	Passo Fundo	UPF
22	Curitiba	PoP-PR, PUC PR
23	Belém	UFPA
24	São Leopoldo	Unisinos
25	Belo Horizonte	Diveo


## Main Characteristics of the Project

- Partners do not receive a “black box”
  - They have access to their honeypot
  - They can extend the honeypot’s configuration
- The honeypot does not capture production data
  - Only data directed to the honeypot is collected
- They can internally use the data captured by their own honeypot
  - As a complement to their IDS infrastructure
  - To detect infected machines, etc

## Details of the Honeypots

- OpenBSD as the base Operating System (OS)
- Honeyd
  - Emulates different OSs
  - Runs listeners to emulate services (IIS, ssh, smtp, etc)
- Proxy arp using arpd
- Payload logged using pf
- Each honeypot uses a netblock range (from /28 to /24)
  - 1 management IP
  - Other IPs are used to emulate different OSs and services
- Ability to collect malware samples
  - Listeners developed for: mydoom, subseven, socks, ssh, etc.
- Ability to implement spam traps

# Architecture



## Relationship With the Partners (1/2)

- Partners are:
  - Other CSIRTs
  - Known incident reporters
  - Organizations that have attended our courses
  - Organizations introduced by trusted partners
- Partners provide:
  - Hardware
  - IP range
  - Time to configure/run the honeypot

## Relationship With the Partners (2/2)

- CERT.br provides daily encrypted summaries to partners (without honeypots' IPs):
  - Activities seen in each honeypot
  - Combined activities seen in all honeypots
  - Correlations between activities seen in several honeypots
- Confidentiality issues:
  - Only coordination knows all the honeypots' locations
  - Coordination doesn't disclose the honeypots's location/address
  - Partners adhere to a Confidentiality Agreement:
    - Don't disclose the honeypot's location/address
    - Don't share any information without the coordination consent

## CERT.br Use of Data

- Notification of Brazilian networks that are originating malicious activities seen in the honeypots
- Data donation to trusted parties
- Produce public statistics about current malicious activities
  - Very important to have a local view to compare with data collected by other projects (SANS Storm Center, Arakis, ISDAS, etc)

## Other Benefits

- Allow members to improve their expertise in several areas:
  - Honeypots, intrusion detection, firewalls, OS hardening, PGP, etc
- Improve CERT.br relationship with the partners
  - Enhance trust
  - Create opportunities for new partnerships

## Challenges to Maintain the Project

- Depend on partners' cooperation to maintain and update the honeypots
  - Harder to maintain than a “plug-and-play” honeypot
- The project becomes more difficult to manage as the number of honeypots grow
  - More people to coordinate with
  - PGP keys' management issues
  - Increasing need for resources (disk space, bandwidth, etc)
  - Some honeypots start to present hardware problems

## References

- Brazilian Honeypots Alliance  
<http://www.honeypots-alliance.org.br/>
- Previous presentations about the project  
<http://www.cert.br/presentations/>
- Several papers presented at other conferences  
<http://www.honeynet.org.br/papers/>
- CERT.br  
<http://www.cert.br/>