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## **CGI.br Members**

As established by the presidential decree No 4.829, 03/09/2003

## 9 representatives from the Government

Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (coordination)

Ministry of Communications

**Presidential Cabinet** 

Ministry of Defense

Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade

Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management

National Telecommunication Agency

National Council for Scientific and Technological Development

National Council of State Secretariats for Science, Technology and Information

## 12 representatives from private sector & civil society

Private Sector (4)

Internet access and content providers

Telecommunication infrastructure providers


Hardware, telecommunication and software industries


Enterprises that use the Internet

Civil Society (4)

Scientific and technological community (3)

Internet Expert (1)







# Incident Management

- Coordination
- Technical Analysis
- Support for recovery

# Training and Awareness

- ▶ Courses
- Presentations
- ► Best Practices
- Meetings

## **Trend Analysis**

- Distributed Honeypots
- ▶ SpamPots
- Processing of threat feeds







SEI Partner Network



#### **Creation:**

**August/1996**: report with a proposed model for incident management for the country is published by the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee – CGI.br<sup>1</sup>

**June/1997**: CGI.br creates CERT.br (at that time called NBSO – *NIC BR Security Office*) based on the report's recommendations<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>https://www.nic.br/grupo/historico-gts.htm

<sup>2</sup>https://www.nic.br/pagina/gts/157

#### Mission


To increase the level of security and incident handling capacity of the networks connected to the Internet in Brazil.

#### **Focus of the Activities**

- National focal point for security incident reports
- Support technical analysis and the understanding of attacks and threats
- Develop collaborative relationships with other entities
- Increase the capacity of incident detection, event correlation and trend analysis in the country
- Transfer the acquired knowledge through courses, best practices and awareness materials



# Incidents Reported to CERT.br: DDoS notifications – history



## **Brazilian ISPs Ecosystem**

## **Cetic.br National ISPs Survey**

- Total ISPs (estimated): 6618
- Respondents: 2177
- 75% have 1000 clients or less

https://www.cetic.br/pesquisa/provedores/


## IX.br SP

One of the biggest in the world

- #1 in participants (1467)
- #3 in traffic both average (3.5T) and peak (5.1T)
   <a href="https://www.pch.net/ixp/dir">https://www.pch.net/ixp/dir</a>

≈700 ASes use MikroTik as core router

## **LACNIC ASN Allocation Stats**



http://www.lacnic.net/en/web/lacnic/estadisticas-asignacion

## We need a healthier ecosystem:

## National Initiative – A More Secure Internet Program

## Objectives:

- Reduce Denial of Service attacks originating in Brazilian networks
- Reduce the Prefix Hijacking, Route Leak, and IP Spoofing
- Reduce the vulnerabilities and configuration failures in network elements
- Create a culture of security

## Incentive to adopt best practices:

- Hardening
- Close open services
- Routing Security
- Anti-spoofing (BCP 38)

### Joint initiative:

 NIC.br/CGI.br, ISOC and ISPs, Hosting and Telco Associations https://bcp.nic.br/i+seg






# A More Secure Internet Program: Early Results – Reducing Open Services

## Focusing more on the top 5:

- The top 1 (SNMP) reduced from 500K IPs to 100K
  - most in the big Telcos
- Ubiquity devices became abused recently
  - mostly on small ISPs

### Common denominator in most of them:

- They are low cost CPEs (home routers)
- with bad factory defaults and do not allow changes most of the time



https://www.cert.br/stats/amplificadores/



## A More Secure Internet Program: Early Results – Antispoofing (BCP 38) Implementation

- Higher adoption than in other countries
- Noted by CAIDA Spoofer Project

# Matthew Luckie mjl at caida.org Mon May 13 23:01:57 -03 2019

- Previous message (by thread): [GTER] Governança de Internet SSIG 2019 Ao vivo
- Next message (by thread): [GTER] BCP38 deployment in Brazil
- Messages sorted by: [date] [thread] [subject] [author]

#### Hi,

I am wondering if you can help me understand why it is that Brazil, as a country, seems to be active in deploying BCP38. When I look at the monthly reports that CAIDA's Spoofer Project sends to GTER, there are often 5-6 networks that have deployed BCP38 in the past month. This is more than in other countries / regions.

https://eng.registro.br/pipermail/gter/2019-May/076685.html

Minimum Security Requirements for Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) Acquisition

Work developed by the LAC-AAWG – Latin American and Caribbean Anti-Abuse Working Group

#### Joint Publication of

- M³AAWG Messaging, Malware and Mobile Anti-Abuse Working Group
- LACNOG Latin American and Caribbean Network Operators Group
- Editor: Lucimara, LAC-AAWG Chair / CERT.br
   Currently available in:
  - English, Japanese and Korean

New translations to be released soon:

- Portuguese, Spanish, French and German

www.lacnog.net/docs/lac-bcop-1 www.m3aawg.org/CPESecurityBP



# Gracias! Thank You!

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August 5, 2019

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