

4º Congresso Brasileiro e Latino-Americano de IoT


Painel: Cybersecurity Group - an International joint effort.

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Attacks to Smart Cities / IoT:

A Few Examples



DDoS attack halts heating in Finland amidst winter

A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack halted heating distribution at least in two properties in the city of Lappeenranta, located in eastern Finland. In both of the events the attacks disabled the computers that were controlling heating in the buildings.

Both of the buildings where managed by Valtia. The company who is in charge of managing the buildings overall operation and maintenance. According to Valtia

CEO, Simo Rounela, in both cases the systems that control circulation were temporarily disabled.



mmmi

Things technologies, researchers have performed a new analysis on IoT gadgets and are ready to reveal the

There are many vulnerabilities in IoT:

Security is neglected

- even in security devices!

Few vendors have security updates lifecycle

- bug report mechanism
- update distribution

Most of vendors repeat old mistakes:

- weak (or lack of) authentication
 - default common passwords/ hardcoded passwords / "backdoors"
- Obsolete protocols without cryptography (ex: Telnet)
- Unnecessary services enabled by default

Lack of a holistic view of security

- Device, mobile apps, network, cloud

What Should We Request from Developers/ Vendors / Manufacturers

- Security must be by design and by default
 - not optional
 - consider security requirements since project initiation
 - use secure development best practices
 - secure factory defaults

Updates

- need to be possible and has to be secure (supply chain attacks)
- Security should be included in the corporate risk management
 - entire cities can stop in case of vulnerability
 - risk of damage to users
- Plan for large scale updates
- Has to have a Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) → Maturity



https://www.wired.com/2015/07/jeep-hack-chrysler-recalls-1-4m-vehicles-bug-fix/

Minimum Security Requirements for Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) Acquisition

- Joint Publication of
 - M³AAWG Messaging, Malware and Mobile Anti-Abuse Working Group
 - LACNOG Latin American and Caribbean Network Operators Group
 - Editor: Lucimara, LAC-AAWG Chair / CERT.br
- Currently available in:
 - English, Japanese and Korean
- New translations to be released soon:
 - Portuguese, Spanish, French and German

https://www.lacnog.net/docs/lac-bcop-1

https://www.m3aawg.org/CPESecurityBP



What is inside?

A reference checklist for hardware decisions

→ Let's ask vendors for better products while improving our networks!

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CAPÍTULO VII DA SEGURANÇA E DAS BOAS PRÁTICAS

Seção I Da Segurança e do Sigilo de Dados

- Art. 46. Os agentes de tratamento devem adotar medidas de segurança, técnicas e administrativas aptas a proteger os dados pessoais de acessos não autorizados e de situações acidentais ou ilícitas de destruição, perda, alteração, comunicação ou qualquer forma de tratamento inadequado ou ilícito.
- § 1º A autoridade nacional poderá dispor sobre padrões técnicos mínimos para tornar aplicável o disposto no caput deste artigo, considerados a natureza das informações tratadas, as características específicas do tratamento e o estado atual da tecnologia, especialmente no caso de dados pessoais sensíveis, assim como os princípios previstos no caput do art. 6º desta Lei.
- § 2º As medidas de que trata o caput deste artigo deverão ser observadas desde a fase de concepção do produto ou do serviço até a sua execução.

http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil 03/ ato2015-2018/2018/lei/L13709.htm