

Developments in the SpamPots Project

Klaus Steding-Jessen

jessen@cert.br

CERT.br – Computer Emergency Response Team Brazil


<http://www.cert.br/>

NIC.br – Network Information Center Brazil

CGI.br – Brazilian Internet Steering Committee

About CERT.br

Created in 1997 as the national focal point to handle computer security incident reports and activities related to networks connected to the Internet in Brazil.



International Partnerships




<http://www.cert.br/mission.html>

Our Parent Organization: CGI.br

Among the diverse responsibilities of The Brazilian Internet Steering Committee – CGI.br, the main attributions are:

- to propose policies and procedures related to the regulation of the Internet activities
- to recommend standards for technical and operational procedures
- to establish strategic directives related to the use and development of Internet in Brazil
- **to promote studies and technical standards for the network and services' security in the country**
- to coordinate the allocation of Internet addresses (IPs) and the registration of domain names using <.br>
- **to collect, organize and disseminate information on Internet services, including indicators and statistics**

CGI.br/NIC.br Structure



- 01- Ministry of Science and Technology
- 02- Ministry of Communications
- 03- Presidential Cabinet
- 04- Ministry of Defense
- 05- Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade
- 06- Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management
- 07- National Telecommunications Agency
- 08- National Council of Scientific and Technological Development
- 09- National Forum of Estate Science and Technology Secretaries
- 10- Internet Expert

- 11- Internet Service Providers
- 12- Telecom Infrastructure Providers
- 13- Hardware and Software Industries
- 14- General Business Sector Users
- 15- Non-governmental Entity
- 16- Non-governmental Entity
- 17- Non-governmental Entity
- 18- Non-governmental Entity
- 19- Academia
- 20- Academia
- 21- Academia

Agenda

SpamPots Project 1st Phase Review

- Data Captured

- Data Mining

Developments in the past 12 months

SpamPots Project – Current Stage

- Start Deployment of Sensors Worldwide

- Architecture Overview

- Partners/Members Area

- Online Campaign Identification and Data Mining

SpamPots Project 1st Phase Review

Data Captured

- 10 low-interaction *honeypots*
 - 5 broadband providers, 1 home and 1 business connection each
 - emulating open proxy/relay services and capturing spam


period	2006-06-10 to 2007-09-18
days	466
emails	524.585.779
avg. emails/day	1.125.720
recipients	4.805.521.964
avg. recpts/email	≈ 9,2
unique IPs	216.888
unique ASNs	3006
unique CCs	165

Module	Type	Requests	%
HTTP	connect to 25/TCP	89,496,969	97.62
	connect to others	106,615	0.12
	get requests	225,802	0.25
	errors	1,847,869	2.01
	total	91,677,255	100.00
SOCKS	connect to 25/TCP	46,776,884	87.31
	connect to others	1,055,081	1.97
	errors	5,741,908	10.72
	total	53,573,873	100.00

Data Mining

Characterization of Campaigns

- Frequent Pattern Trees showing different campaigns
- Characteristics: keywords, layout, language, encoding, URLs, services abused



Developments in the past 12 months

Data Capture and Collection:

- Capture software rewritten
 - better disk usage
 - collect more details about each message for data mining
 - facilitate data donation
 - facilitate archival
 - IPv6 ready

Data Mining:


- Frequent Pattern Tree algorithm is now incremental
- Developed the “Spam Miner System”
 - geographical location of campaigning sources
 - detailed information about each campaign

SpamPots Project Current Stage

Start Deployment of Sensors Worldwide

- Global view of the data
- Better understand the abuse of the Internet infrastructure by spammers
- Use the spam collected to improve antispam filters
- Develop better ways to
 - identify phishing and malware
 - identify botnets via the abuse of open proxies and relays
- Provide data to trusted parties
 - help the constituency to identify infected machines
 - identify malware and scams targeting their constituency

Architecture Overview



Partners/Members Area

Partners/Members Website

Network Information Center Brazil

Home Statistics MRTG Status Admin

Spampots

targ-BR-01
All



Spampots Project

Using Honeypots to Measure the Abuse of End-User Machines to Send Spam

[Documents](#): include text here.

[Timeline](#): include text here.

Spampots



targ-BR-01

Legend:

-  spampot online, all status checks succeeded.
-  spampot online, at least 1 status check out of threshold.
-  spampot-to-server connection succeeded, but server-to-spampot connection failed.
-  spampot off-line.

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Statistics – All sensors: last 15 minutes

Network Information Center Brazil

Home Statistics MRTG Status Admin

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Registro

Spampots

targ-BR-01
All

SpamPots Project

Spam Statistics

Last 15-minute snapshot: all spampots

Period: 2009-06-24 (16h45) to 2009-06-24 (17h00) GMT

[Country Codes](#) | [AS Numbers](#) | [Protocols](#) | [Ports Traffic](#) | [more details: CIDR blocks and IP addresses](#)

Summary

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spampot	emails (%)	recipients (%)	CCs	ASNs	CIDRs	IPs	connections	proto	ports		
 BR-01	5,400	100.00	45,793	100.00	3	5	23	51	684 S4, S5	1080	
All	5,400	100.00	45,793	100.00	3	5	23	51	684	S4, S5	1080

Spampots: 1 / 1

Country Codes

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Country Codes sorted by emails

#	CC	description	emails (%)	recipients (%)	proto	spampots		
1	 PH	Philippines	3,857	71.43	28,768	62.82 S4, S5	1	
2	 US	United States	781	14.46	6,304	13.77 S4, S5	1	
3	 TW	Taiwan, Province of China	762	14.11	10,721	23.41 S4, S5	1	
Total			5,400	100.00	45,793	100.00		

Country Codes sorted by recipients

Statistics – All sensors: last 15 minutes (cont.)

AS Numbers sorted by emails

#	ASN	description	CC	emails (%)	recipients (%)	proto	spampots		
1	10222	INFOVISION-AS-PH Infovision Data Se...	PH	3,857	71.43	28,768	62.82	S4, S5	1
2	22439	VRTSERVERS - Vrtservers, Inc	US	781	14.46	6,304	13.77	S4, S5	1
3	3462	HINET Data Communication Business G...	TW	671	12.43	9,665	21.11	S4, S5	1
4	4780	SEEDNET Digital United Inc.	TW	60	1.11	762	1.66	S4, S5	1
5	9924	TFN-TW Taiwan Fixed Network, Telco ...	TW	31	0.57	294	0.64	S5	1
Total				5,400	100.00	45,793	100.00		

AS Numbers sorted by recipients

#	ASN	description	CC	recipients (%)	emails (%)	proto	spampots		
1	10222	INFOVISION-AS-PH Infovision Data Se...	PH	28,768	62.82	3,857	71.43	S4, S5	1
2	3462	HINET Data Communication Business G...	TW	9,665	21.11	671	12.43	S4, S5	1
3	22439	VRTSERVERS - Vrtservers, Inc	US	6,304	13.77	781	14.46	S4, S5	1
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5	9924	TFN-TW Taiwan Fixed Network, Telco ...	TW	294	0.64	31	0.57	S5	1
Total				45,793	100.00	5,400	100.00		

Protocols

[top](#)

Protocols sorted by emails

protocol	short	connections	emails (%)	recipients (%)		
SOCKS 4	S4	398	3,204	59.33	27,109	59.20
SOCKS 5	S5	286	2,196	40.67	18,684	40.80
Total		684	5,400	100.00	45,793	100.00

Protocols sorted by recipients

protocol	short	connections	recipients (%)	emails (%)		
SOCKS 4	S4	398	27,109	59.20	3,204	59.33
SOCKS 5	S5	286	18,684	40.80	2,196	40.67

Statistics – All sensors: last 15 minutes (cont.)

CIDR Blocks

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Top 10 CIDR Blocks sorted by emails

#	CIDR block	ASN	CC	emails (%)	recipients (%)	proto	spampots
1	113.20.184.0/22	10222	PH	927 17.17	6,938 15.15	S4, S5	1
2	110.44.128.0/22	10222	PH	907 16.80	6,721 14.68	S4, S5	1
3	112.109.8.0/22	10222	PH	634 11.74	4,711 10.29	S4, S5	1
4	112.109.4.0/22	10222	PH	570 10.56	4,243 9.27	S4, S5	1
5	110.44.136.0/22	10222	PH	567 10.50	4,247 9.27	S4, S5	1
6	74.222.0.0/20	22439	US	403 7.46	3,153 6.89	S5	1
7	64.56.64.0/21	22439	US	378 7.00	3,151 6.88	S4	1
8	118.170.0.0/16	3462	TW	339 6.28	3,729 8.14	S4, S5	1
9	110.232.160.0/22	10222	PH	252 4.67	1,908 4.17	S4	1
10	114.46.0.0/16	3462	TW	146 2.70	1,645 3.59	S4, S5	1
11	others (13)	—	—	277 5.13	5,347 11.68	—	—
Total				5,400 100.00	45,793 100.00		

Top 10 CIDR Blocks sorted by recipients

#	CIDR block	ASN	CC	recipients (%)	emails (%)	proto	spampots
1	113.20.184.0/22	10222	PH	6,938 15.15	927 17.17	S4, S5	1
2	110.44.128.0/22	10222	PH	6,721 14.68	907 16.80	S4, S5	1
3	112.109.8.0/22	10222	PH	4,711 10.29	634 11.74	S4, S5	1
4	110.44.136.0/22	10222	PH	4,247 9.27	567 10.50	S4, S5	1
5	112.109.4.0/22	10222	PH	4,243 9.27	570 10.56	S4, S5	1
6	118.170.0.0/16	3462	TW	3,729 8.14	339 6.28	S4, S5	1
7	74.222.0.0/20	22439	US	3,153 6.89	403 7.46	S5	1
8	64.56.64.0/21	22439	US	3,151 6.88	378 7.00	S4	1
9	114.46.0.0/16	3462	TW	2,455 5.36	106 1.96	S4, S5	1
10	110.232.160.0/22	10222	PH	1,908 4.17	252 4.67	S4	1
11	others (13)	—	—	4,537 9.91	317 5.87	—	—
Total				45,793 100.00	5,400 100.00		



Statistics – Each sensor: last 15 minutes

Summary

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Category	Counter	Category	Counter
Emails received	4,574	Connections	571
Recipients	37,717	Unique Country Codes	5
Rcpt domains (max)	1	Unique ASNs	8
Rcpt domains (avg)	1.00	Unique CIDRs	23
Message size (max)	49.51 kB	Unique IPs	41
Message size (avg)	3.09 kB		

Graphics showing the number of emails & recipients over the last 24 hours (in chunks of 15 minutes).




Country Codes

[top](#)

Country Codes sorted by emails

#	CC	description	emails (%)	recipients (%)	proto		
1	PH	Philippines	3,175	69.41	23,763	63.00	S4, S5
2	TW	Taiwan, Province of China	731	15.98	8,708	23.09	S4, S5
3	US	United States	637	13.93	5,212	13.82	S4, S5
4	CN	China	30	0.66	30	0.08	S5
5	N/A	n/a	1	0.02	4	0.01	S5
Total			4,574	100.00	37,717	100.00	

Statistics – MRTG



Status for each sensor

Last update: 2009-06-24 - 17h15 - GMT

spampot	beat	uptime	OS	load	disk	pflogd	honeyd	ntpd	rsync
 BR-01	5s	0d 4:11h	4.5	3.80	3.8G / 118G	ok	1.5c	0.115966s	2009-06-23 21:09:40 +0000

Thresholds

beat: (heartbeat) periodic connection from spampot to collector server

- └ x - # ≥ 60s, or spampot-to-server connection fail
- └ #s - 20s < # < 60s #s - 5s ≤ # ≤ 20s #s - # < 5s

uptime: how long the spampot is running

- └ **OFF-LINE** - server-to-spampot and spampot-to-server connection fails (other fields: "--")
- └ x - server-to-spampot connection fail (other fields: "--")
- └ # - # < 2 days # - # ≥ 2 days

subordinated checks:

- └ **OS:** operating system (OpenBSD) version
 - └ # - # < 4.3 # - # ≥ 4.3
- └ **TZ:** timezone
 - └ # - # ≠ GMT # - # = GMT
- └ **load avg:** load average (first number, over 1 minute)
 - └ # - # > 20 # - 10 ≤ # ≤ 20 # - # < 10
- └ **disk:** disk space used / available (usage percentage of /var partition)
 - └ ### - % > 90 ## - 80 ≤ % ≤ 90 ## - % < 80
- └ **pflogd:** pflogd service status
 - └ x - service off-line ok - service online
- └ **honeyd:** honeyd service status
 - └ x - service off-line # - service online, v. ≠ 1.5c # - service online, v. = 1.5c
- └ **ntpd:** ntpd service status
 - └ x - service off-line x - service online, seconds deviation read fail
 - └ #s - service online, # > 1.0s #s - service online, 0.5s ≤ # ≤ 1.0s #s - service online, # < 0.5s

rsync: timestamp of last rsync (spam data)

- └ x - rsync inactive or timestamp read fail
- └ # - # ≥ 24h # - 12h ≤ # < 24h # - # < 12h

Online Campaign Identification and Data Mining

Spam Miner – Online Campaigning Monitoring System Prototype

Spam Campaigns Visualization

http://spamming.speed.dcc.ufmg.br/spamming/campaign.html

The Spam Mining Project

Home | Campaign Detection | Worldwide Campaign Visualization | Papers | People

Spam Miner


TIME: 2006-08-10 16:24:24

Select a Visualization Type: Map Satellite Terrain


The map displays various countries with colored markers representing different spam campaigns. The markers are color-coded according to the legend on the right. The map includes a navigation panel on the left with zoom and pan controls, and a legend on the right with three tabs: Map, Satellite, and Terrain. The map shows a high density of markers in North America, Europe, and Asia.

- Click on a marker on the map to get details from the spam campaigns currently being monitored by our honeypots.
- Each color represents a different spam campaign.
- A summary of all campaigns currently being monitored can be observed on the table below.
- Each campaign strategy represents the sequence of characteristics the spammer has chosen to obfuscate while disseminating a given spam campaign.

Spam Miner – Campaign Details



Spam Miner – Campaign Details (cont.)



Requirements for Hosting a Sensor

- A low-end server
 - e.g. Pentium Dual-Core, 2.80GHz, 1GB RAM, 150GB SATA
- 1 public IP address
- \approx 1Mb/s
- No filter between the honeypot and the Internet

Looking for Partners Interested in...

- Hosting a sensor
- Receiving data
 - spams, URLs, IPs abusing the sensors, etc
- Helping to improve the technology
 - Analysis, capture, collection, correlation with other data sources, etc
- All partners will have access to all data if they want



References

- CERT.br
<http://www.cert.br/>

- This presentation will be available (soon) at:
<http://www.cert.br/docs/presentations/>